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ABSTRACT 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) carry out important activities in 
many countries, often generating considerable negative impact 
regarding the enjoyment of human rights.  This paper addresses 
issues of attribution of responsibility in international customary law 
and international human rights law, considering that international 
remedies are one of the possible venues for access to justice in case 
national redress fails.  The question is whether responsibility only 
arises when the State does not comply with its duty of SOEs’ human 
rights impact, or whether acts and/or omissions by SOEs may also 
be directly attributable to the State.  Finally, the paper looks into a 
recent proposal that it is necessary to use “piercing the veil” theories 
in order to complement theories of state responsibility and evaluates 
its usefulness for international human rights law.  The article argues, 
innovating on this point, that SOEs are the only business entities 
which have, as of now, direct responsibilities under international 
law lege lata. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM 
The question of this paper arises due to the problem of access to 
justice in corporate human rights violations, which is amply 
documented.1  For a series of reasons, third party victims—
especially, affected communities—cannot sue foreign (and 
sometimes also national) corporations effectively when these 
corporations have participated in human rights abuse.  The reasons 
commonly discussed are the impossibility to access the arbitration 
forum where the investment contracts or treaties are adjudicated;2 
the lack of recognition or justiciability of certain human rights at the 
national level, especially, economic, social and cultural rights;3 
general problems of access to justice in the national context, like 
corruption, lack of effectiveness, lack of legal aid, or similar issues;4 
lack of recognition of extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases when 
access to justice in the host state fails;5 and unavailability of funds or 
reserves in special purpose vehicles or other host state 
 
 1 See generally Jennifer Zerk, Corporate liability for gross human rights abuses: 
towards a fairer and more effective system of domestic law remedies, Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), (Feb. 2014), 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLawRemedies/StudyDo
mesticeLawRemedies.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQ36-LU9Z] (investigating the 
effectiveness of domestic judicial responses to gross human rights abuses by 
corporations); OHCHR, Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of 
business-related human rights abuse, U.N.  Doc. A/HRC/32/19 (May 10, 2016), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLawRemedies/
A_HRC_32_19_AEV.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3ME-YHQV] (providing guidance 
for the problem of business-related human rights abuses). 
 2 See generally GLOBAL PROJECT FINANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT (Sheldon Leader & David Ong eds., 2011) (providing an overview of 
the barriers to arbitration of investment contracts or treaties in the project finance 
sector). 
 3 See generally SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(Sandra Fredman & Meghan Campbell, eds., 2016) (noting that the adjudication of 
conflicts over socio-economic human rights requires innovative solutions to 
overcome the obstacles of justiciability at the national level). 
 4 See La Oroya v. Peru, Admissibility Decision, Inter-Am. Co. H.R. P-1473-06 
at ¶68 (2009) (highlighting the ineffectiveness of domestic judicial remedies when 
confronting abuses by a state owned metallurgical complex which contaminated La 
Oroya, Peru by noting the unavailability of evidence of compliance by the complex 
in regards to a grave and urgent judgement against it 3 years earlier). 
 5 See generally MIRKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS TREATIES 118–259 (2011) (examining the difficulties involved in holding a 
state accountable for its obligations under a human rights treaty towards an 
individual located outside its jurisdiction). 
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incorporations, which make payment of compensation illusory.6  In 
international law, no direct human rights obligations of corporations 
have been recognized as of yet; the soft law standards that do exist 
cannot be enforced.7  This replicates, to a large extent, the problems 
of access to justice that exist in domestic law, unless the State can be 
made responsible—usually indirectly—for business behavior. 
Typical human rights violations will depend on the sector in 
which the SOE works.  SOEs are usually to be found in the extractive 
and energy sectors; in the services sector, especially banking and 
passenger transportation; and in telecommunications.8  As has been 
documented in case studies, violations in these sectors include, 
violations of indigenous land rights,9including eviction or 
resettlement without free, prior, and informed consent; violations of 
the right to health, the right to water; or the right to live in a healthy 
environment in relation to emissions, spills, rupture of tailing 
dams,10 or similar environmental damage due to contamination; 
 
 6 See Leader & Ong, supra note 2, at 3–12, 107–142. 
 7 See generally Special Representative of the Secretary General, Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) endorsed 
by A/HRC/Res/17/4 (June 16, 2011) (proposing a set of principles to be followed 
by transnational corporations and other business enterprises); Tara Melish & Errol 
Meidinger, Protect, Respect, Remedy and Participate: ‘New Governance’ Lessons for the 
Ruggie Framework, in THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 303, 304 (Radu Mares ed., 2012) (critically 
appraising the “Protect, Respect, Remedy” framework created by John Gerard 
Ruggie).  For more on direct accountability, see generally JERZEJ LETNAR & TARA 
VAN HO, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS: DIRECT CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2015) (examining the direct human rights obligations of 
international companies); Humberto Cantú, Derechos Humanos y Empresas: 
Reflexiones desde América Latina, Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos 
(2017), 
http://perso.unifr.ch/derechopenal/assets/files/obrasportales/op_20170808_02.
pdf [https://perma.cc/BCB3-2KSP] (discussing the relationship between SOEs and 
human rights in various Latin American countries). 
 8 See Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], Guidelines on Corporate 




 9 See Pueblo Indígena Kichwa de Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Preliminary 
Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) 
245, ¶2  (June 27, 2012), 
https://www.escrnet.org/sites/default/files/Court%20Decision%20_English_.p
df [https://perma.cc/SFL6-GB3L] (highlighting threats to indigenous populations 
by SOEs in the context of resource extraction). 
 10 See generally Caio Borges & Tchenna Fernandes Maso, The Collapse of the 
River Doce Dam, 14 SUR (2017), https://sur.conectas.org/wp-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss4/4
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violations of individual and collective labor rights;11 and violations 
of the right to life, integrity, freedom of assembly, or freedom of 
expression in relation to social protest against business projects.12  
Finally, there might be violations of the right to information or the 
right to participation in the project planning, design, exploration, 
operation, and closure phases.  With regard to community and client 
relations in the service sector, violations may additionally occur 
through discrimination, be it due to race, ethnicity, gender, sexual 
orientation, national origin, religion, participation in a trade union, 
or socio-economic condition, among other grounds. 
In the case of State-owned enterprises (SOEs), there are three 
additional problems, which in part aggravate the challenges just 
mentioned.  They are also a problem in themselves, with regard to 
the capacity of a state to avoid responsibility: first, it is not exactly 
clear in which cases a SOE’s acts and omissions in matters of human 
rights can be attributed to the State directly, and in which cases they 
cannot be attributed.  As Georgios Petrochilos puts it, arbitrators 
“seem to proceed on the basis that if an entity would be an organ in 
the experience of those needed to decide the issue, then an organ it 
is,”13 which signals, ironically, that jurisprudence is inconsistent.  
Second, SOEs might in certain contexts claim state immunity and 
make access to justice in international fora illusionary.14  Third, due 
 
content/uploads/2017/06/sur-25-ingles-caio-borges-tchenna-fernandes-maso.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/88M6-CDZL] (exploring human rights abuses through the 
prism of a mining waste dam collapse in Brazil). 
 11 See Trabajadores Cesados de Petroperú y otros v. Perú, Preliminary 
Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) 
No. 344 (Nov. 23, 2017) (holding that Peru violated labor rights of 165 workers of 
two ministries and two state-owned enterprises enshrined in article 26 ACHR when 
dismissing them between 1996 and 1998, as well as their rights to due process and 
access to justice, recognized in articles 8.1 and 25 ACHR). 
 12 See Pueblo Indígena Kichwa de Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Preliminary 
Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) 
245, ¶2  (June 27, 2012). 
 13 Georgios Petrochilos, Attribution of Conduct of Non-State Organ Entities: An 
Introduction, in THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 351, 357 
(Shaheeza Lalani & Rodrigo Polanco Lazo eds., 2015). 
 14 See JULIA PULLEN, DIE IMMUNITÄT VON STAATSUNTERNEHMEN IM 
ZIVILRECHTLICHEN ERKENNTNIS- UND VOLLSTRECKUNGSVERFAHREN 276–280 (2012) 
(arguing that, if immunity is conceded to state-owned enterprises in civil 
procedure, based on the modern function-based theory of immunity, then the 
international law exception to immunity in case of gross human rights violations 
must also apply).  On the internationalization of SOEs, see generally STATE-OWNED 
MULTINATIONALS (Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra ed., 2018) (discussing the differences 
between SOEs and state-owned multinational enterprises). 
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to the fact that many states started high-impact industries like 
mining, oil and gas, or energy, through the creation of SOEs in times 
when environmental standards were still low or nonexistent, 
considerable historic damage was generated by SOEs, with many 
contaminated sites waiting for clean-up, or workers dealing with 
serious work-related diseases.15  Many of these SOEs have since been 
privatized or liquidated.  In these situations, the question of state 
responsibility is even more pressing.  Said more simply, in order to 
argue a concrete case, it is a condition sine qua non to identify the 
correct hypothesis under which a State is responsible to make a 
successful case.  Otherwise, the result of the judgment would be 
arbitrary and not based on legal considerations. 
The question addressed in this paper is, therefore, under which 
conditions must acts and omissions of SOEs be attributed to the State 
and not remain in the private realm.  This question has been 
discussed in public international law but not sufficiently in 
international human rights law.  This justifies going back to the 
“antique niceties of law (for public bodies)”16 despite the necessity 
to (also) analyze SOEs from a perspective of corporate governance.17  
As the latest contribution from a UN body on the topic focused 
mostly on governance and omitted questions of international public 
law, this article pretends to complement the debate. 
Answering this question will enable us to pose (and answer 
elsewhere)18 a second question, i.e., in which situations must a State 
respond for the human rights violations committed by its SOEs.  
Here, I will only argue that attribution under international law is 
possible if the State controls the enterprise, or if the latter exercises 
governmental or public functions.  This does in no case exclude State 
responsibility that arises from the lack of regulation, oversight, or 
due diligence by state organs, which violates the horizontal 
obligations to protect that States have under international human 
rights treaties, a point which is not controversial.  Overall, this paper 
is the first to argue that SOEs have direct responsibilities in 
international human rights law, thus converting them into the only 
 
 15 See Borges & Maso, supra note 10. 
 16 Larry Catá Backer, The Human Rights Obligations of State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs): Emerging Conceptual Structures and Principles in National and International 
Law and Policy, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 827, 879 (2017). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Schönsteiner, Human Rights Obligations of State-Owned Enterprises, 
Presentation, Heidelberg (Dec. 1, 2016) and Nürnberg (Feb. 13, 2018). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss4/4
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business entities which under international law lege lata have direct 
responsibilities. 
This paper proceeds as follows: after briefly setting out the 
reasons why it matters whether state responsibility arises directly or 
indirectly (section 1), different sources are analyzed in order to 
determine and systematize criteria for direct19 attribution of state 
responsibility (section 2), drawing especially from the ILC Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 
2001, and taking into account the OECD Guidelines on Governance 
of SOEs, the rules of state immunity, arbitral jurisprudence and 
specifically, the jurisprudence of, respectively, the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR), of the Inter-American Commission and 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (section 3).  In the fourth 
and last section, the proposal of an alternative or complementary 
argument on piercing the corporate veil between a SOE and the State 
is discussed.  Starting from Petrochilos’ observation that “one way 
to see this case is as one where the corporate veil, which would 
normally clothe the [state-owned] company and insulate it from the 
State, [is] lifted on account of pervasive influence of the State on its 
actions.”20  The argument of piercing the corporate veil allegedly fills 
the voids of responsibility that are said to be left out in the law of 
international state responsibility (section 4).21  The article will show 
that this hypothesis does not hold true for, at least, international 
human rights law.  Finally, the article concludes with a list of criteria 
which allows the determination in human rights cases of whether 
there is direct state responsibility for actions and omissions of SOEs. 
 
 19 Defined as direct responsibility due to the SOEs acts or omissions, or as 
indirect responsibility due to the omissions of regulatory or oversight organs, 
respectively; the term is not widely used, but appears in some recent discussions 
on international responsibilities regarding non-state actors.  See generally Elizabeth 
Nielsen, State Responsibility for Terrorist Groups, 17 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L. LAW & POLICY 
151 (2010) (examining the range of possible standards of state responsibility for 
actions of SOEs in the context of counterterrorism measures); Michael Feit, 
Responsibility of the State under International Law for the Breach of Contract Committed 
by a State-Owned Entity, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 142 (2010) (discussing how 
governments can be held directly responsible when SOEs breach contracts with 
foreign investors); Antenor Hallo de Wolf, Reconciling Privatization with Human 
Rights, SCHOOL OF HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH SERIES 49, INTERSENTIA (2012) (studying 
the effects of privatizing state functions and services on human rights). 
 20 See Petrochilos, supra note 13, at 357. 
 21 See generally ALBERT BADIA, PIERCING THE VEIL OF STATE ENTERPRISES IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2014) (discussing corporate veil-piercing in the 
context of international law, particularly investment arbitration cases). 
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2. WHY DOES THE MANNER OF ATTRIBUTION MATTER? 
One might think that in the end, it should not matter whether 
state responsibility derives from a failure of the State to respect 
(through a SOE) or a failure of an oversight organ to protect human 
rights against violations from this “private-like” actor.  The State 
will be responsible anyway in both cases.  It seems that the European 
Court of Human Rights, and from a different angle, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (see sections 3.1 and 3.2) have 
worked with these or similar presumptions. 
But it is not as easy as that, because the distinction between 
direct and indirect obligations, is associated with different degrees of 
the duty of care regarding the control by state officials versus non-
state actors: the threshold of preventative duties is more onerous for 
state organs themselves than it is for organs tasked with the 
oversight of private actors, where usually the (lower) standard of 
due diligence, rather than obligations of result, applies.  This is due 
to reduced assumptions of knowledge of what happens in the 
private economic sphere and lower standards of control than for 
state organs.22  Additionally, literature is clear on the fact that due 
diligence does not apply regarding the State’s duty to refrain from 
certain acts where obligations of result prevail.23  If, based on 
customary international law criteria, we were able to conclude that 
the SOE were a state organ or acted on behalf of the State, certainly 
these more onerous obligations would apply to them; and if, to the 
contrary, they were considered private actors, such obligations 
would not be due under international law.  Only indirectly, by 
 
 22 For a discussion on the duties of prevention, see generally Pasquale De 
Sena, Responsabilité Internationale et Prévention des Violations des Droits de l’homme, in 
Emmanuel Décaux, LA PREVENTION DES VIOLATIONS DES DROITS DE L’HOMME (2013); 
Sébastien Touzé & Emmauel Décaux, La Notion de Prévention en Droit International 
des Droits de l’homme, in Emmanuel Décaux, LA PREVENTION DES VIOLATIONS DES 
DRIOTS DE L’ HOMME  (2013).  Dimitri Xenos, POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Routledge eds., 2012); Franz Ebert, & Romina 
Sijnienski, Preventing Violations of the Right to Life in the European and the Inter-
American Human Rights Systems: From the Osman Test to a Coherent Doctrine on Risk 
Prevention?, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 343 (2015) (arguing that international courts ought 
to clarify and further develop the Osman test, which determines whether a state has 
the duty to prevent violations of the right to life by non-state actors). 
 23 See generally Maja Sersic, Due Diligence: Fault-Based Responsibility or 
Autonomous Standard?, in CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF BUDISLAV VUKAS 153 (Rudiger Wolfrum eds., 2015) (examining 
the historical view that fault is not applicable to international obligation). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss4/4
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virtue of the State’s duty to protect through its oversight organs, 
would a reduced responsibility arise.24 
It is generally held that the duties to protect and to guarantee 
human rights only apply to state organs;25 the question arises how 
these duties would have to be carried out in case the State chose to 
provide guarantees of economic or social rights through its SOEs, 
for example, in the area of water and sanitation.26  Finally, there 
might also be differences between reparation and non-repetition 
guarantees awarded by tribunals depending on whether obligations 
are direct or indirect.  Researching this question empirically, 
however, goes beyond the present argument.27 
Another problem regarding attribution, discussed in literature 
as well, arises through the initial design of SOEs. While it is agreed 
in international law that the setting up of an enterprise by a State 
does not ipso facto generate state responsibility,28 it will be argued 
here that there are certain structural designs of SOEs that per se 
impede access to justice, as they might simply have the consequence 
of avoiding State liability.  In those cases, it would seem that the 
 
 24 See, e.g., IACHR, Indigenous Peoples, Communities of African Descent, Extractive 
Industries, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.doc.47/15 (2015), 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/extractiveindustries2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H5PN-WKR7] (discussing positive responsibilities of states to 
ensure respect for human rights within its jurisdiction under the American 
Convention). 
 25 See, e.g., Ricardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, Responsabilité de l’état pour Violation des 
Obligations Positives Relatives aux Droits de l’homme, 333 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE 
HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 175 (2008) (systematizing international 
and regional human rights jurisprudence regarding State due diligence and 
positive obligations to protect and guarantee human rights).  For a debate, see 
Jonathan Bonnitcha & Robert McCorquodale, The Concept of “Due Diligence” in the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 28 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 899, 916 
(2017) (arguing that enterprises have duties to protect regarding their supply 
chains). 
 26 See Macarena Contreras & Judith Schönsteiner, Derecho al Agua, Emergencias 
y Responsabilidades del Estado y de las Empresas Sanitarias, INFORME ANUAL SOBRE 
DERECHOS HUMANOS EN CHILE, EDICIONES UDP 99 (2017) (discussing generally the 
capacity of the Chilean State to guarantee the right to safe drinking water in the face 
of emergencies, considering that drinking water is provided by private and a state-
owned enterprise). 
 27 See generally Leader & Ong, supra note 4 (discussing non-repetition 
guarantees in human rights jurisprudence). 
 28 See JONAS DEREJE, STAATSNAHE UNTERNEHMEN. DIE 
ZURECHNUNGSPROBLEMATIK IM INTERNATIONALEN INVESTITIONSRECHT UND WEITEREN 
BEREICHEN DES VÖLKERRECHTS 405 (2015) (referring to international jurisprudence on 
attribution of acts and omissions of state-owned enterprises to the State, which 
indicates that the creation of a state-owned enterprises by itself does not generate 
attributability, while the structure defined in its statutes may well do so). 
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State has to respond under international human rights law for the 
sovereign act of creating a badly designed SOE, if this design results 
in human rights violations in the future. 
But there are concerns of international relations and 
international politics too.  As a brief revision of the discussion on 
SOEs in the current international investment schemes shows, in 
several States with a high state investment volume, like China and 
the Nordic or Arab States, it is not always uncontroversial whether 
the activities of these “enterprises in state-vicinity”29 are acting with 
purely economic purposes or whether they intervene with the 
objective of policy-making in their own (home-)states or, in cases of 
foreign investment through SOE, state-owned financial institutions 
or similar bodies, with the aim of economic diplomacy or 
influencing economic policies of the host-state.30  According to 
Poulsen, this might lead to difficulties in determining “who the true 
complainant [or respondent, the author] actually is”, especially in 
“low-transparency environments”.31  In the context of potential 
human rights violations committed by SOEs, such complexity and 
eventual confusion may constitute an impediment to access to 
justice, while according to international human rights law, no 
institutional design may have that effect. 
More generally, a detailed determination of direct obligations of 
business– independent from attribution to any State– is pending 
under international law for all types of business; majority opinion 
considers that business do not have direct obligations under 
international law.32  Soft-law standards define some 
responsibilities– certainly, however, no business responsibility to 
 
 29 Id., at 1. My translation of “Staatsnahe Unternehmen.” 
 30 See generally Yinzhi Miao, The Interplay of the State and the Firms: Overseas 
Listing as a Governance Institution for Chinese SOEs, Focus: Corporate Governance from 
a Comparative Perspective, 10 FRONTIERS L. CHINA 46 (2015) (discussing Chinese 
government efforts to use overseas listing as a tool to restructure and discipline 
SOEs). 
 31 Lauge Poulsen, States as Foreign Investors: Diplomatic Disputes and Legal 
Fictions, 31 ICSID REV. 12, 17 (2016). 
 32 See generally PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE 
LAW (2d ed. 2007) (discussing the regulations currently imposed on Multinational 
Enterprises (“MNEs”); ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON- 
STATE ACTORS (Oxford University Press 2006) (exploring international case law, 
statutes, and treaties to determine what, if any, obligations to non-state actors have 
in international forums).  But see LETNAR & VAN HO, supra note 7. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss4/4
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protect– but generally, those standards remain vague, and are non-
binding.33 
Finally, pressing questions of attribution arise around the issue 
of past damage to the environment, or health, caused by SOEs when 
domestic (and international) standards were still low or non-
existent.  It will be argued in section 3 that if such negative impact 
continues, it must be considered a continuous violation under 
international law, even though in domestic law, statutes of 
limitations apply.  It will be argued that in such cases the State 
should be considered directly responsible for the acts and omissions 
of its SOE. 
Given the challenges of access to justice in business and human 
rights issues generally, and the specific difficulties that might arise 
when trying to sue SOEs for human rights violations in national 
courts, there is a pressing argument for defining more clearly the 
type of attribution of responsibility that arises under international 
human rights law and the differences between these two types of 
attribution, both regarding actions and omissions of SOEs.  This is 
the case even though access to international human rights bodies or 
foreign jurisdictional fora might as well prove illusory, due to their 
notorious backlog of cases34 and in the Inter-American System, 
underfunding.35  Partly, problems also arise due to limited 
jurisdiction, specifically on economic, social and cultural rights. 
Overall, the motive behind this paper is to at least discuss and 
maybe propose a solution to some of the doctrinal or interpretive 
challenges in this regard.  The paper therefore does not pretend to 
analyze all those issues in depth or derive conclusions on customary 
international law, but rather, to draw together recent research from 
different PIL disciplines around a single type of actors, i.e., SOEs, 
and examine to what extent a State should be held directly 
 
 33 See generally Mares, supra note 7; Friedrich, International Environmental “Soft-
law”, Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, Springer 
Verlag (2013). 
 34 Luzius Wildhaber, Der “Backlog” (Rückstand in der Fallbehandlung) des 
Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, in COEXISTENCE, COOPERATION AND 
SOLIDARITY 1825-32 (Holger Hestermeyer et al. eds., 2012) (discussing the backlog 
of cases in the European Court of Human Rights). 
 35 See, e.g., Ariel Dulitzky, Maximizing Justice, Minimizing Delay: Streamlining 
Procedures of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, University of Texas, 21 
(2011), https://law.utexas.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2015/04/2012-
HRC-IACHR-Maximizing-Justice-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU57-FPR2] 
(discussing the limited resources of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
rights, the “Commission suffers a chronic problem of underfunding”). 
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responsible for its SOEs’ acts or omissions relating to human rights 
issues.36 
2.1. State responsibility and attribution: borrowing from the ILC and 
from arbitral decisions 
This section analyzes if and to what extent SOE’s acts and 
omissions in human rights issues can be attributed directly to the 
State.  This will basically depend on whether these acts and 
omissions can be qualified as governmental acts or not.  Recently, 
literature has summarized applicable criteria found in 
jurisprudence; the following critical overview will be based on these 
works and on the analysis of jurisprudence itself.  As criteria differ 
between general international law, OECD standards, the law on 
state immunity, European human rights law, and Inter-American 
human rights law, the respective sources will be discussed 
separately.  Despite an increase in recent debate and publications,37 
the issue is not yet settled in international legal doctrine. 
2.2. SOEs in the Draft Articles of 2001 
The Draft Articles on International State Responsibility of 2001 
only mention SOEs in the commentary to Article 5 when they state 
that acts and omissions may be attributed if these enterprises 
“exercise functions of a public character normally exercised by State 
 
 36 Sovereign Wealth Funds go beyond the scope of this paper; for an analysis 
of SWF and human rights, see Angela Cummine, Ethical Sovereign Investors: 
Sovereign Wealth Funds and Human Rights, in MAKING SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS WORK 163 (Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Jernej Letnar Černič, eds., 2014) 
(discussing the links between government-financed investment and human rights 
by examining sovereign wealth funds).  See generally, Jiangyu Wang, State Capitalism 
and Sovereign Wealth Funds: Finding a “Soft” Location in International Economic Law, in 
ALTERNATIVE VISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 405 (C.L. 
Lim ed., 2016) (concluding that soft legislation should develop a separate legal 
framework for sovereign wealth funds). 
 37 See Backer, supra note 16 (discussing attribution in a more general context of 
questions around SOEs and human rights). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss4/4
2019] State-Owned Enterprise Responsibility in Human Rights 907 
organs, and the conduct of the entity relates to the exercise of the 
governmental authority concerned”.38 
Surprisingly, the commentary to Article 8 does not mention 
SOEs either, although SOEs could of course engage in de facto 
exercise of public authority. Authors such as Dereje have, very 
correctly in my eyes, criticized this view.39  The more consistent 
approach is to treat SOEs as no different from other entities that 
might exercise governmental authority without being formally 
authorized to do so.40  According to Dereje’s thorough study on 
general international law, arbitral tribunals have developed a more 
accurate understanding of the Draft Articles; nevertheless, he found 
inconsistencies when arbitral tribunals apply Articles 5 and 8 of the 
Draft Articles. Although this criticism is not necessarily shared, it is 
sufficiently clear that the exercise of governmental functions by 
SOEs needs to be subsumed under Articles 5 (when explicitly 
delegated) and 8 (when exercised de facto) by SOEs; in those cases, 
state responsibility accrues for acts and omissions of SOEs. 
The ILC commentary on Article 8 explicitly excludes that 
government ownership and the initial establishment of the entity by 
the State automatically ensue state responsibility.  This point has been 
accepted by literature seemingly without further debate. There is no 
significant debate either about excluding the percentage of 
ownership from the debate about attribution;41 no discussion about 
whether there is an obligation to retain control over a SOE due to 
(certain levels of) State ownership; nor about whether there is a 
difference between majority or minority ownership.  The sole 
criterion on whether there is a link between the company and the 
State is the degree of control the latter exercises over the enterprise. 
In this context, the ILC Commentary adds that the analysis cannot 
overlook that “what is regarded as “governmental” under Article 5 
depends on the particular society, its history and traditions.”42 
 
 38 U.N. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, 
art. 5 ¶ 2 (2001) [hereinafter ILC], http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments 
/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6LM-EP39]. 
 39 DEREJE, supra note 28, at 435. 
 40  See DEREJE, supra note 28, at 436. 
 41 The statistical distinction of the World Bank on State ownership (10%) is 
irrelevant, as the criterion turns on the examination of “control”—it is not 
necessarily the case that a minority shareholder position implies less control. 
 42 ILC, supra note 38, at 43.  See also Jaemin Lee, State Responsibility and 
Government Affiliated Entities in International Economic Law, 49 J. WORLD TRADE 117, 
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According to Dereje, in cases of Article 8 attribution, the 
respective act or omission must be proven to stem from a state order 
or directive, or be subject to de facto control by the State.43  The 
difference with Article 5 attribution is sometimes blurry, but is 
mainly an issue of proof, and structural integration of the link 
between the SOE and the State itself. If a formal and stable link 
between the SOE and the State cannot be shown, it might still be 
possible that the lower threshold of Article 8 is met, which only 
requires some kind of formal instruction or instances of control, not 
necessarily a detailed instruction on a legal or regulatory basis.44 
The most relevant question in doctrinal debate generally is, 
however, just as for the purposes of the present argument, whether 
and when SOEs could come under Article 4 of the Draft Articles, that 
is, under a definition of “state organ.”  The commentary to Article 4 
is silent about the issue of SOE—this means that the Draft Articles 
do not conceive of any hypotheses under which SOEs could come 
under the definition of state organs.45  If an entity is controlled by 
the State, maybe even if not completely, but in a sufficiently 
important manner, does this indicate that it is a state organ? As Lee 
puts it: “More specifically, problems have arisen when Article 4 
analyses attempt to address (i) governmental ownership, (ii) 
relevant societal or cultural contexts, and/or (iii) the function being 
carried out by the entity in question.”46 Li for his part insists, 
likewise, in considering different local specificities of SOEs, showing 
that Chinese SOEs function quite differently from their Western 
counterparts.47  The Commentary on Draft Article 5 accounts of such 
 
138 (2015) (emphasizing the importance of cultural context in the determination of 
what is “governmental”). 
 43 See DEREJE, supra note 28, at 435–36. 
 44  See DEREJE, supra note 28, at 421–424; see also ILC, supra note 38, commentary 
to art. 8. 
 45 See Lee, supra note 42 (arguing that international courts have discarded the 
approach of the ILC in defining “state organs”); State Immunity and State-Owned 
Enterprises, CLIFFORD CHANCE (2008), https://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/bhr/files/Clifford-Chance-State-
immunity-state-owned-enterprises-Dec-2008.PDF [https://perma.cc/6NZP-LBT3] 
(noting that the commentary to article 5 states that entities who “may be 
empowered by the law of a State to exercise elements of governmental authority” 
may not be state organs).  But see DEREJE, supra note 28, at 401. 
 46 Lee, supra note 42, at 127. 
 47 See Ji Li, State-Owned Enterprises in the Current Regime of Investor-State 
Arbitration, in THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION 380, 403 
(Shaheeza Lalani & Rodrigo Polanco Lazo eds., 2015) (demonstrating “significant 
variations among SOEs” in China). 
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differences, too, when indicating that governmental functions 
depend on “the particular society, its history and traditions”.48  Lee, 
concluding, suggests resolving the issues by including an explicit 
definition of “state organ” in newly negotiated treaty texts.49  This 
would also allow to ensure that no specific references to types of 
conduct or functions are necessary when determining the scope of 
the term “state organ”, and would permit that those tests are 
relegated exclusively to examinations under Articles 5 and 8.  Dereje 
argues that the differences between the Draft Articles and ICJ 
jurisprudence on Article 4 need to be harmonized considering that 
an entity should be considered a state organ if it does not enjoy 
sufficient autonomy, independent of whether the entity has a legal 
personality separate from the State.50  He shows that the 
examination of attribution under Article 4 Draft Articles that the ICJ 
carries out, is consistent, systematic and suitable to clarify confusion 
that might arise under the ILC commentary.  In Article 4 tests, the 
question of ownership should not play a role, as both Dereje and Lee 
argue. Lee explains:  
There may be a chain of command and organic relationship 
among various governmental agencies of all sorts and levels, 
but ( . . . ) looking into the governmental ownership in the 
course of Article 4 state organ discussions, does not fit into 
the basic structure embodied in the ILC Draft Articles.51   
The question that ensues for Lee is: what about the “chain of 
command” type argument when there is close control of an SOE by 
governmental organs?52  It seems that this question could be brought 
under considerations of Article 4, or if not applicable for other 
reasons, Article 5 of the Draft Articles.  As Dereje summarizes, the 
line between Article 4 and Article 5 attribution is not always that 
clear.53 
 
 48 ILC, supra note 38, at 43, commentary to art. 5, ¶ 6. 
 49 Lee, supra note 42, at 147. 
 50  DEREJE, supra note 28, at 401–403. 
 51 Lee, supra note 42, at 130. 
 52 See Ru Ding, Public Body or Not: Chinese State-Owned Enterprise, 48 J. WORLD 
TRADE 167 (2014) (stating that the debate on the scope of “public body” vs. “state 
organ” in WTO jurisprudence needs not to be addressed here, as it would seem that 
the differentiation does not fundamentally change issues in the context of human 
rights obligations). 
 53  DEREJE, supra note 28, at 415. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
910 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 40:4 
Taking these issues together, the following criteria for 
attribution can be summarized, following Dereje’s systematization: 
attribution requires effective control, which is usually given if 
structural control is taking place.  This criterion is not 
controversial.54  The foundation by the State is not decisive for the 
later attribution of state responsibility, just as State ownership is 
not.55  Rather, structural elements such as the State’s voting rights in 
the SOE are critical, together with the right to nominate and 
withdraw leading executives56 and the right to give concrete 
instructions or to exercise veto powers.57  Finally, reporting and 
accountability obligations, just as the public presentation of the SOE, 
especially by state officials, is an element that must be taken into 
account when deciding attribution in concrete cases.58  It is very 
relevant to note in the present context that human rights compliance 
of the obligation to fulfill is always considered a governmental 
function.  This becomes clear when, for example, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights decides in Ximenes Lopes vs. Brazil that 
despite privatization and/or concessioning of the country’s mental 
health system, the State remains responsible for preventing human 
rights violations in those private institutions.59  The Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has used a similar approach 
regarding the right to the highest attainable standard of health,60 the 
right to water, and also in relation to equality between men and 
women.61  The European Court of Human Rights has, however, been 
 
 54  DEREJE, supra note 28, at 401. 
 55  DEREJE, supra note 28, at 405. 
 56  DEREJE, supra note 28, at 406. 
 57  DEREJE, supra note 28, at 407, 410. 
 58  DEREJE, supra note 28, at 411–12. 
 59 See Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil, Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 149 (July 4, 2006), 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_149_ing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AM7X-KEPK] (holding that Brazil had violated the rights to life 
and humane treatment of a mental health patient). 
 60 See CESCR, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standard 
of health (art. 12), ¶. 12(b) and 35, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000), 
https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838d0.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5LR-
3VQ6] (stressing accessibility as essential elements in the provision of right to health 
and duties of states to provide equal access). 
 61 See CESCR, General Comment No. 16: The equal right of men and women to the 
enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights (art. 3 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2005/4 (Aug. 11, 2005),  
https://www.refworld.org/docid/43f3067ae.html [https://perma.cc/Q8B4-
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more cautious, and as stated in Hatton vs. United Kingdom, awards a 
“wide margin of appreciation”62 on how to regulate private 
services.63 
2.3. OECD standards on SOE and the report of the WG on Business 
and Human Rights 
The OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-
Owned Enterprises principally address States; they are not directed 
to the companies themselves.  This is, in the first place, indirect 
evidence for the close relationship that exists or may exist between 
SOEs and the State.  The Guidelines nevertheless insist, more than 
any other international document on SOEs, on the separation 
between the State and the SOE, especially regarding the selection of 
board members and CEOs.  This becomes most apparent in their 
recommendation of several measures that distance the enterprise 
from the principal, i.e., the State.64  The Guidelines explicitly 
establish that SOEs should not have to perform “charitable acts or to 
provide public services that would more appropriately be carried 
out by the relevant public authorities.”65  Contrary to the empirical 
evidence, which shows that many States have opted to provide 
public services through SOEs,66 the OECD seems to push States 
towards SOEs that have exclusively utility objectives, not policy 
objectives.  The mere fact, however, that the Guidelines are 
addressed to the State—both as owner and regulator of SOEs—
makes it clear that their actions and omissions cannot be easily 
separated from the State and its responsibility, even with regard to 
management, and human rights risk management.  This fact should 
 
DSVR] (clarifying state actors’ responsibility to monitor and regulate non-state 
actors to ensure equal rights to enjoy social, economic and cultural rights). 
 62 See Hatton and others v. the UK, Eur. Ct. H.R., Reports 2003-VIII (July 8, 2003), 
¶ 100-101, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-61188%22]} 
[https://perma.cc/2VZ2-U5RH] (discussing whether an increase in night flights to 
London Heathrow Airport violated the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by increasing noise levels for those living under 
the approach flight path). 
 63 On human rights obligations in the process of and after privatization, see 
generally Hallo de Wolf, supra note 19, at 126-198. 
 64 OECD, supra note 8, passim. 
 65 OECD, supra note 8, at 60. 
 66 OECD, supra note 8, at 7, 30. 
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at least be taken into account when discussing attribution, and the 
political options the OECD suggests are to be taken. 
The Guidelines directly reference human rights, when indicating 
that “SOEs should observe high standards of responsible business 
conduct, including with regards to the environment, employees, 
public health and safety, and human rights. The state’s expectations 
regarding the responsible business conduct of SOEs should be 
disclosed in a clear and transparent manner.”67  The role of boards 
and management is to ensure that those expectations “are integrated 
into the corporate governance of SOEs, supported by incentives and 
subject to appropriate reporting and performance monitoring.”68 
If the normative ideal of the OECD Guidelines were 
implemented faithfully by States, it seems that no direct attribution 
would arise. While Chapter 17 of the Transpacific Partnership 
maintained the OECD approach, it is more realistic when 
establishing, in line with the Draft Articles, that when a SOE carries 
out governmental functions, these actions or omissions can be 
attributed to the State (Art. 17.3).  As several authors indicate, the 
definition of “governmental authority” or “governmental 
functions” is still pending.69  For Li, SOEs should only be excluded 
from investor-state arbitration if they “discharge clear and 
narrowly-defined governmental functions.”70  It will be argued in 
sections 3.1 and 3.2 that regional human rights jurisprudence has a 
consistent response to this conundrum, at least with regard to SOE 
related human rights guarantees, and that in those cases, 
governmental functions are precisely, but not narrowly, defined. 
Indirectly, the OECD confirms that interpretation, when its 2015 
report suggests that public services (corresponding to the fulfillment 
of human rights) should be kept clearly within state responsibility. 
The UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights based 
its report on SOEs and Guiding Principle 4 on SOEs, on the OECD 
Guidelines of 2015.  The Guiding Principles nor the report mention 
or discuss issues of attribution.  While criticizing the details of the 
report, Catá Backer coincides that only a governance approach to 
SOE human rights responsibility can effectively cover the real modus 
 
 67 OECD, supra note 8, at 57–61. 
 68 Id. at 60. 
 69 See Petrochilos, supra note 13, at 353–360; see also Lee, supra note 42; DEREJE, 
supra note 28. 
 70 See Li, supra note 47, at 404 (following the arbitral tribunal in the case 
Československa Obchodní Banka, A.S. (CSOB) v. The Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No 
ARB/97/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (May 24, 1999)). 
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operandi of SOEs.71  This approach—as well as Catá Backer’s 
recommendations—departs from the approach UN and regional 
human rights treaty bodies have taken on SOEs.  These bodies 
consider that States owe the obligation to respect under human 
rights treaties,72 rather than only being encouraged to “lead by 
example,”73 adopting human rights due diligence policies that are to 
be above industry standards (rather than in line with the minimum 
core of international human rights obligations). 
Catá Backer, who does not discuss the issue of attribution in debt, 
considers that the Guiding Principles introduce a contradiction 
regarding the human rights responsibility of SOEs.  By defining a 
special rule for SOEs in Guiding Principle 4, they create a 
“disjunction” from the business responsibilities of pillar 2.74  This 
reading should be considered overly pessimistic about the 
consistency of the Guiding Principles.  It seems, rather, that, just as 
companies, SOEs have to respect human rights just as defined in 
pillar 2, but as state-owned companies, they have to do better about 
this than private companies, and additionally, state responsibility 
can arise pursuant to their violations.  Looking at SOEs from the 
perspective of international human rights law, however, finds both 
readings problematic.   Neither can a SOEs claim in all situations 
that it is “only” a company or an “exemplary” company, nor does a 
careful reading of the Guiding Principles exclude Catá Backer’s 
claim that SOEs are to be subject to governance related measures on 
business and human rights—as their internal structure and relation 
with their supply chains actually are based on a company-logic, not 
a public-law logic. 
 
 71  Catá Backer, supra note 16. 
 72 See, e.g., UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 
General Comment No. 23 (2016) on the right to just and favourable conditions of work 
(article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), ¶ 58, 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/23 (Apr. 26, 2016), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5550a0b14.html [https://perma.cc/RML7-
QFTZ] (“First, State parties have an obligation to respect the right by refraining 
from interfering  directly or indirectly with its enjoyment. This is particularly 
important when the State is the employer including in State owned or State 
controlled enterprises.”). 
 73 See UN Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, Report on State-owned Enterprises, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/32/45 (May 4, 2016) [hereinafter UN Working Group], 
http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/HRC/32/45&Lang=E  
[https://perma.cc/2QKP-L67T] (illustrating what States are expected to do in their 
role as owners of enterprises and rationale). 
 74 See Catá Backer, supra note 16, at 860–61. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
914 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 40:4 
The present research provides arguments on the end contrary to 
Catá Backer’s concern: it looks at the “state-like” elements of SOEs 
and argues, precisely, for enhanced State accountability in relation 
to SOE’s human rights violations. Not because the SOE is governed 
or administered as a public organ; rather, because the SOEs private 
body is closely linked to the State—by control or by function.  To use 
an image, this research looks at making sense of the fact that SOEs 
continue to be linked to the State through complex but not less 
evident, umbilical cords. 
2.4. State immunity and State-owned Enterprises 
There is an additional criterion that may be taken into account 
when establishing whether an entity must be considered a state 
organ or exercising any kind of governmental function. States tend 
to claim immunity in foreign or arbitral courts if they consider that 
a certain activity is sovereign.75  To a certain extent this also applies 
to SOEs.76  According to the 2004 Convention, immunity may be 
claimed when a SOE performs governmental functions; more 
precisely, when “agencies or instrumentalities of the State or other 
entities, to the extent that they are entitled to perform and are 
actually performing acts in the exercise of sovereign authority of the 
State” (Art. 2.1b.iii). 
Various authors have criticized the ambiguous language in the 
2004 Convention on the Immunity of States and their Property, 
which leads to difficulties in determining the concrete status of SOEs 
under that Convention.77  In addition, the concept of state immunity 
may well be abused in the context of state enterprises and several 
authors claim that this indeed occurs.78  Be this as it may, invoking 
state immunity is evidence that the State considers a certain entity 
as a state organ, or as exercising governmental functions.79  It should 
 
 75 For a useful overview of state immunity doctrines in the UK, US and 2004 
Convention on State Immunity, see generally CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 45; 
HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY (3d ed. 2015). 
 76 See generally PULLEN, supra note 14. 
 77 See CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 45, at 17. 
 78 See Lee, supra note 42. 
 79 See UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property, Arts. 2 and 10(3), U.N. Doc. A/59/508, (Dec. 2, 2004), 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/recenttexts/english_3_13.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HN5B-82UY] (clarifying that when a state is capable of suing or 
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therefore, simply for the sake of consistency, not be able to avoid 
state responsibility and direct attribution of its acts or omissions, as 
it would be a logical error to uphold, simultaneously, that a SOE 
should enjoy state immunity, but not generate state responsibility. 
As Van Aaken argued in 2014, recent jurisprudence by the 
ECtHR and ICJ shows that indeed, immunity does not automatically 
exclude human rights concerns, but must be balanced against 
human rights obligations.80  In that sense, Catá Backer’s 2017 
recommendation on this specific issue had already entered into 
human rights jurisprudence.81  The ILC furthermore suggests that 
certain commercial activities that are undertaken for the public 
good, such as purchase of food or medicine in emergency situations, 
could qualify for granting immunity.  Finally, regulatory immunity 
might apply to SOEs, and they might eventually be immune from 
execution, especially in relation to decisions handed down against 
the State (and not the SOE itself).82 
3. HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 
The criteria for attribution presented in sections 2.1–2.3 stem 
from general international law.  Being interested specifically in 
human rights responsibility of SOEs, however, it is impossible not 
to revise whether human rights instruments or jurisprudence define 
specific rules on the attribution of state responsibility; if this were 
the case, those rules would have to be applied in substitution to 
general international law, due to the principle of lex specialis.83  The 
two International Covenants are silent on the issue, and only speak 
of “states” as owners of obligations. 
The same is true for the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the American Convention on Human Rights; the Inter-
American Court has never explicitly argued on the issue of 
 
being sued or possesses legal personality, its immunity cannot be affected); see also 
Anne Van Aaken, Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts and Commercial 
Activities: A Functional View on Regulatory Immunity and Immunity from Execution, in 
IMMUNITIES 131, 143–145 (Anne Peters ed., 2014) (observing that SOEs are granted 
sovereign immunity for activities where the SEO is exercising sovereignty, i.e. 
performing government functions); FOX & WEB, supra note 75. 
 80 Van Aaken, supra note 79, at 140. 
 81  Catá Backer, supra note 16, at 38. 
 82 Van Aaken, supra note 79, at 149–157, 157–168. 
 83 ILC, supra note 38, art. 55. 
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attribution.  However, it has decided several cases involving State-
owned enterprises, simply applying an Article 4 hypothesis.  Thus, 
in Kichwa Indigenous Community of Sarayaku vs. Ecuador, the regional 
Court simply assumed the governmental function of a SOE, which 
was in charge of administrating oil concessions, without debate and 
without dissenting opinions. The implicit criteria the Court is using 
will be spelt out in section 3.2. 
In the European Court of Human Rights, in turn, criteria of 
attribution have been discussed explicitly, and have also been 
analyzed in—although scarce84—literature (see section 3.1).  As will 
be shown in the light of jurisprudence, these criteria provide a better 
understanding of the way in which States have to be responsible for 
the acts and omissions of their enterprises in human rights matters.  
What will become clear is that in international human rights law, 
more than in general international law, there are hypotheses of 
attribution which responds more clearly to the effectiveness 
standard regarding access to justice. 
3.1 Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 
The European Court has discussed many cases that involve, in 
some way or the other, state-owned enterprises or state property.  
The present analysis only looks at those cases in which the Court has 
discussed attribution matters. 
In Fadeyeva vs. Russia, the European Court of Human Rights was 
asked to decide on state responsibility for the failure to resettle a 
person living close to a steel plant, which was responsible for 95% 
of the air pollution in the city.  Although the diseases the woman 
suffered from could not be derived directly from air pollution, the 
Court found that the State had not struck a fair balance between the 
dangerous situation in which the applicant was in, and other 
interests, especially, the interests of other persons on the council 
housing waiting list, which should have been considered less urgent 
if not exposed to the same health threat.  On attribution, the Court 
concluded—after taking into account private ownership at the 
 
 84 See generally Mikko Rajavuori, How Should States Own? Heinisch v. Germany 
and the Emergence of Human Rights Sensitive State Ownership, 26 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 
727 (2015), http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/26/3/2603.pdf [https://perma.cc/P68U-
UT2M] (suggesting that the notion of public shareholder is helpful in 
understanding how states should govern the human rights performance of 
corporations through ownership). 
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moment of the complaint, the State obligation to regulate and 
exercise oversight, and initial State-ownership—that: 
The authorities in the present case were certainly in a 
position to evaluate the pollution hazards and to take 
adequate measures to prevent or reduce them.  The 
combination of these factors shows a sufficient nexus between 
the pollutant emissions and the State to raise an issue of the 
State’s positive obligation under Article 8 of the 
Convention.85   
It is not clear, however, if or why the fact that the company had 
been privatized actually had any impact on the outcome of the case.  
The ratio turns entirely on the illegality of operating without a 
“safety belt” around the enterprise, and the failure to resettle the 
claimant,86 both activities intimately linked to the responsibilities of 
oversight organs or state organs responsible for public services. 
In Uj vs. Hungary, to the contrary, the Court found that the 
“reputational interest” of a SOE was “commercial” in nature, and 
therefore, not protected under the morals limitations to the freedom 
of expression.87  In cases such as Industrial Financial Consortium 
Investment Metallurgical Union vs. Ukraine, which dealt with the 
fairness of privatization proceedings of a SOE, attribution criteria 
were neither an issue. 
More telling regarding attribution is the question whether a 
state-owned entity would have any standing under the ECHR (and 
therefore, would not be considered part of the State it belonged to) 
is the judgment in Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping vs. Turkey, where 
the Court assessed the entity’s “legal status and, where appropriate, 
the rights that status gives it, the nature of the activity it carries out 
and the context in which it is carried out, and the degree of its 
independence from the political authorities.”88  For the Court, the 
 
 85 See Fadeyeva v. Russia, Judgment, 45 Eur.Ct.H.R. 10, ¶ 92 (2005) (“The 
Court concludes that the authorities in the present case were certainly in a position 
to evaluate the pollution hazards and to take adequate measures to prevent or 
reduce them. The combination of these factors shows a sufficient nexus between the 
pollutant emissions and the State to raise an issue of the State’s positive obligation 
under Article 8 of the Convention.”). 
 86 Id. at ¶116–134. 
 87 See Uj v. Hungary, App. No. 23954/10, Eur. Ct. H.R.¶ 22 (2011) (finding that 
commercial reputational considerations do not implicate a moral dimension). 
 88 See Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping v. Turkey, App. No. 40998/98 Eur. Ct. 
H.R.  1081, ¶ 79 (2007) (reasoning that the entity being considered “neither 
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control over the company was decisive, not who held the property 
in it.  Comparing the criteria of the ECtHR with the criteria in arbitral 
jurisprudence, the human rights court uses one additional criterion 
to determine the business-state nexus: the nature of a company’s 
activities.  This criterion seems to mirror, the OECD concern on 
maintaining public services within the public realm (see section 2.2). 
In Transpetrol vs. Slovakia, the Court applied a slightly more 
detailed list of criteria in order to establish whether a State-owned 
company could have standing under the Convention, as a claimant 
against the State, which at the time of the facts, held 51% of 
ownership in the company.  The Court dismissed this argument, 
considering that: 
The applicant company was a private-law entity subject to 
the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and to the same legal 
regime as any other commercial company in Slovakia.  It did 
not have immunity, did not carry out any public-
administration functions and did not participate in the 
exercise of public power.89   
Furthermore, “[t]he applicant company had professional 
management and its operations were of a commercial nature.  The 
State carried no liability for the applicant company’s obligations and 
the applicant company was subject to the normal rules and 
procedures concerning insolvency.”90  In addition, it was relevant 
for the Court that the company did not enjoy a monopoly position.91  
The Court found it critical that the entity “is governed essentially by 
company law, does not enjoy any governmental or other powers 
beyond those conferred by ordinary private law in the exercise of its 
activities and is subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary rather than 
the administrative courts.”92  Additionally, the Court found a joint 
interests in the proceedings, as the State acted as a common 
intervener, and the SOE was represented by the same lawyer as the 
State in other proceedings.93 
 
participates in the exercise of governmental powers nor has a public-service role or 
a monopoly in a competitive sector.”). 
 89 See Transpetrol v. Slovakia, Ap. No. 28502/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Third Section) 
¶ 58. (2011). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. ¶ 62. 
 92 Id. ¶ 61. 
 93 Id. ¶ 74. 
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In the case Luganskvugillya vs. Ukraine, the ECtHR had to 
evaluate whether a Ukrainian coal company could be considered 
having ius standi against Ukraine.  The court argued that:  
The applicant company is managed and fully controlled by 
the Government of Ukraine, through its various institutional 
structures, including formerly through the Ministry of Fuel 
and Energy of Ukraine and currently the Ministry of Coal 
Industry of Ukraine.  The company exercised certain public 
functions in administration of funds allocated by the State 
for restructuring of the coal industry.94  
The Court found that the petition was inadmissible.  It is not 
clear from the judgment which role liquidation proceedings play in 
the attribution (or not) of state responsibility.  In other decisions, 
however, the Court considered that the non-applicability of 
insolvency laws suggests attribution of state responsibility.95 
Regarding the issue of whether the State must be considered 
vicariously liable for debts of State-owned or State-related 
companies, the Court reiterated regarding attribution in Yershova vs. 
Russia—a case over a formerly State-owned steel plant, which 
significantly contaminated the town where the claimant lived, that: 
[T]he Court will have regard to such factors as the 
company’s legal status, the rights that such status gives it, 
the nature of the activity it carries out and the context in 
which it is carried out, and the degree of its independence 
from the authorities ( . . . ). The Court will notably have to 
consider whether the company enjoyed sufficient 
institutional and operational independence from the State to 
absolve the latter from its responsibility under the 
Convention for its acts and omissions.96  
 It thus puts emphasis on the independence from the State, but 
also confirmed the “nature of activities” criterion of earlier 
jurisprudence. 
The Court also pointed out that “the applicant company’s 
domestic legal status as a separate legal entity does not, on its own, 
absolve the State from its responsibility under the Convention for 
 
 94 See State Holding Company Luganskvugillya v. Ukraine, App. No. 
23938/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Fifth Section) 2 (2009). 
 95 See Transpetrol, supra note 89, ¶ 58. 
 96 Yershova v. Russia, App. No. 1387/04 Eur. Ct. HR (2010) (First Section), ¶ 55. 
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the company’s debts.”97  This is certainly an important limitation to 
abuse by separate corporate entities, when these are acting de facto 
on the State’s behalf.  While highlighting in the Yershova case that 
the nexus between State and company was not as close as in the 
Mykhaylenky case,98 the court concluded that “given in particular the 
public nature of the company’s functions, the significant control over 
its assets by the municipal authority and the latter’s decisions 
resulting in the transfer of these assets and the company’s 
subsequent liquidation,”  it was the State that was “to be held 
responsible under the Convention for [the company’s] acts and 
omissions.”99  The Court spelled out the meaning of “nature” and 
linked the concept to the consideration of whether the company’s 
functions were “public” (governmental in other contexts).  This 
means that the acts and omissions of state-owned public services 
companies have to be considered more readily attributable to the 
State. 
On the same token, in Heinisch vs. Germany, the Court found in 
2011 that public shareholders have major obligations of due 
diligence and investigation into possible wrongdoing or 
negligence;100 the Court explained that: 
[W]hile the Court accepts that State-owned companies also 
have an interest in commercial viability, it nevertheless 
points out that the protection of public confidence in the 
quality of the provision of vital public service by State-
owned or administered companies is decisive for the 
functioning and economic good of the entire sector.  For this 
reason the public shareholder itself has an interest in 
 
 97 Id. ¶ 56. 
 98 Id. ¶ 57 (“the Court notes the Government’s argument that the degree of the 
State’s involvement in the company’s activities cannot be equated with that in 
the Mykhaylenky and Others case.”). 
 99 Id. ¶ 62 emphasis added. 
 100 See Rajavuori, supra note 84, at 736 (discussing the result of Heiniscich v. 
Germany, in which he believes the court gave public shareholders of an SOE a 
second obligation and purpose. “When a company in the state’s portfolio is 
involved in human rights-sensitive activity, a public shareholder should allow for 
a thorough examination, investigating and clarifying the alleged deficiencies on the 
issue”); see, e.g., Heinisch v. Germany, 2011 V Eur. Ct. H.R. 229, ¶ 71 (observing that 
it is especially important for state-owned companies’ to disseminate information to 
public shareholders). 
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investigating and clarifying alleged deficiencies in this 
respect within the scope of an open public debate.101 
This rationale has not been reiterated explicitly, however. In a 
case in 2016, the Court did not provide a response to a similar 
argument submitted by the applicant,102 and there has not been any 
opportunity to know whether the Grand Chamber would agree with 
the reasoning of the Chamber.  The argument, however, is consistent 
with the viewpoint of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 
Ximenes Lopes vs. Brazil, where the regional body considered that 
even private actors carrying out health services on behalf of the 
State, have to be regulated following strict due diligence standards, 
as if they were in fact public services.103 
In Mykhaylenky, the Court solved a question on debts generated 
by SOEs towards its workers, holding that the State was liable.  The 
reason was that:  
The debtor company had operated in the highly regulated 
sphere of nuclear energy and conducted its construction 
activities in the Chernobyl zone of compulsory evacuation, 
which is placed under strict governmental control on 
account of environmental and public-health considerations, 
[especially, that] the State [had] prohibited the seizure of the 
company’s property on account of possible contamination.104   
The Court also considered relevant that the company 
management was in the hands of the Ministry of Energy, and not an 
independent board.105  Just as with monopolies, the more regulated 
an area of economy in which the SOE operates is, the more 
attributable an activity is. 
In Alisic, the ECtHR confirmed Mykhaylenky insofar “a State may 
be responsible for debts of a State-owned company, even if the 
 
 101 Id. para. 89. 
 102 See generally Langner v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 14464/11 (Fifth 
Section) (2016). 
 103 See Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil, Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 149, ¶ 141  (July 4, 2006) (“The 
Court has established that the duty of the States to regulate and supervise the 
institutions which provide health care services, as a necessary measure aimed at the 
due protection of the life and integrity of the individuals under their jurisdiction, 
includes both public and private institutions which provide public health care 
services, as well as those institutions which provide only private health care.”).  See, 
e.g, id. ¶27 (Ramirez, J., concurring). 
 104 Mykhaylenky v. Ukraine, Eur. Ct. H.R (Second Section) ¶ 45, (2005). 
 105 Id. 
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company is a separate legal entity, provided that it does not enjoy 
sufficient institutional and operational independence from the State 
to absolve the latter from its responsibility under the Convention.”106  
The test of previous jurisprudence was thus reiterated,107 and 
recently applied in Krndija vs. Serbia108 and Burmych vs. Ukraine.109  
The Court specified:  
In this kind of cases, the Court needs to examine whether the 
non-enforcement was caused by the delay attributable to the 
respondent State itself, or whether the insolvency of the 
debtor company could have made it objectively impossible 
for the respondent State to honour its obligation to enforce 
the judicial decision in the applicant’s favour.110  
As the State had not provided any explanation as to why the 
judgment could not be enforced, the Court found the State 
responsible under the European Convention under the effet utile 
principle.111 
In several recent cases that involved SOEs, no mention 
whatsoever was made regarding attribution.112  The case of 
Śimaitienè, allowed the Court to reiterate its previous jurisprudence 
regarding past violations of the right to property by a former SOE, 
 
 106 See Aliśič et al. v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand Chamber 
App. No. 60642/08 ¶ 114 (2014). 
 107 Id.; see also, Voronkov v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No 39678/03 ¶ 47 (2015) 
(“The court reiterates that a state may be responsible for debts of a State—owned 
company, even if the company is a separate legal entity.”). 
 108 Krndija et al. v. Serbia, Eur Ct. H.R. App. No. 30723/09 (Third Section) ¶ 
66 (2017) (“The court observes that . . . decisions rendered against a socially/state-
owned company . . . that the state is directly liable for their debts and omissions.”). 
 109 Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 40450/04 ¶ 
36, 78-82 (2010) (discussing implementation of a pilot program based off of the 
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers in 2004 that would enable human 
rights claims of a similar nature to go directly to a specific state body as to 
streamline enforcement rather than hinder the courts with similar issues); Burmych 
v. Ukraine, Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand Chamber App. No. 46852/13 ¶ 11 (2017) ( following 
the Ivanov pilot decision to implement a pilot program in Ukraine). 
 110  See Krndija, supra note 108, ¶ 68. 
 111 See Krndija, supra note 108, ¶ 68, 73–74. 
 112 See generally Surikov v. Ukraine, Eur. Ct. H.R App. No. 42788/06 (2017) 
(failing to even mention attribution); Dickmann and Gion v. Romania, Eur. Ct. 
H.R  App. No. 10346/03 and 10893/04 ¶ 14, 18-20 (2017) (assuming attribution by 
virtue of jointly suing the municipality and a municipal enterprise); Medzlis v. 
Bosnia, Eur. Ct H.R. App. No. 17224/11 ¶ 80 (2017); Merabishvili v. Georgia, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. App. No. 72508/13 (2017) (regarding the detention of a CEO to coerce sale 
of private company to a SOE, where the Court’s argument was entirely based on 
direct state responsibility of security forces). 
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which held that partial restitution and compensation were sufficient 
to repair the damage.113 
In 2018, finally, the Court explicitly pronounced itself on state 
responsibility of Bulgaria with regard to the actions (and omissions) 
of a state-owned mine. The Court explained: 
The mine was managed by a company which was entirely 
State-owned. For the Court, the fact that that company was a 
separate legal entity under domestic law cannot be decisive 
to rule out the State’s direct responsibility under the 
Convention.  The parties have provided no information on 
the extent of State supervision and control of the company at 
the relevant time.  Of relevance is that it was not engaged in 
ordinary commercial business, operating instead in a heavily 
regulated field subject to environmental and health-and-
safety requirements.  It is also significant that the decision to 
create the mine was taken by the State, which also 
expropriated numerous privately-owned properties in the 
area to allow for its functioning, under legislation concerning 
“especially important State needs”.  All of the above factors 
demonstrate that the company was the means of conducting a State 
activity and that, accordingly, the State must be held 
responsible for its acts or omissions raising issues under the 
Convention.114 
It thus reiterated and specified the threshold for state 
responsibility, including, interestingly, a new aspect: the reference 
to the degree of environmental and health-and-safety regulation, 
which differentiated the nature of the activities from usual 
“commercial activities.”   Future jurisprudence should clarify this 
reasoning, as the strong regulation seems to be generally related to 
the dangerous character of activities, rather than their non-
commercial character.  Therefore, this indicator should not be 
included in an attribution checklist until further specified or 
confirmed by the Court.  Finally, in Könyv-Tár Kft and Others, the 
Court in 2018 found Hungary responsible for indirect expropriation 
through the creation of a monopoly administered by a SOE.  The 
finding of the violation was based, however, on the evaluation of 
 
 113 See Śimaitienè v. Lithuania, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 550556/10 ¶ 53 (2017) 
(finding that partial restitution and compensation are appropriate remedies for 
property which cannot be returned). 
 114 See Dimitar Yordanov v. Bulgaria, ECHR App. No,. 3401/09 ¶60 (2018). 
References to case-law omitted. Emphasis added. 
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government action and SOE action, and therefore, the case is not too 
useful for defining differentiate criteria of attribution. The same is 
true for Kurşun vs. Turkey where the SR originated from failures in 
the investigative process into a gas explosion, and Khadija Ismayilova, 
a wiretapping case in which Azerbaijan was found responsible for 
not investigating correctly into whether wiretapping to an 
opposition leader was carried out pursuant to specific orders by a 
state-owned telecommunications company, or pursuant to 
unofficial orders by some of that company’s employees.115 
While coinciding with arbitral jurisprudence regarding 
attribution on several issues, the European Court of Human Rights 
has been clear and consistent on including two important points in 
its analysis.  First, the nature of SOE activities.  Very recently, it 
included the consideration of environmental and health-and-safety 
regulation into that analysis.  Second, it seems that more often than 
not, the Court implicitly departs from a Draft Article 4 assessment; 
in such cases, it revises globally (not separately for SOE and 
oversight organs) whether, on the merits, the Convention rights 
have been guaranteed. It is only in its admissibility jurisprudence 
that the Court addresses SOE issues separately.  It would seem that 
a more detailed argument on direct and indirect State responsibility 
would be useful, in order to effectively distinguish, for example, the 
different levels of due diligence that the State as a whole owes. 
3.2. Reasoning in the Inter-American System of Human Rights 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights dealt with several 
cases involving a SOE without discussing attribution at all. Instead, 
the Court simply assumed attribution and eventually, found the 
States responsible for several of the violations alleged. Thus, for 
example, in Abrill Alosilla vs. Peru, a case on unlawful dismissal of 
civil servants, workers and technical staff employed in a SOE, 
attribution of the violations to the State was not even mentioned, 
and less so, argued upon. The SOE was dealt with on the same 
footing as a ministry. Similarly, in Sarayaku vs. Ecuador, the Court 
analyzed the role of the Ecuadorian SOE Petroecuador, a contractual 
partner of a private company that gained the right to explore and 
 
 115 See Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. 65286/13 and 
57270/14 ¶ 125 (2018) (finding that investigative deficiencies on the part of the state 
contributed to an inability to conclude state responsibility). 
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exploit an oil concession through said contract.116  Petroecuador in 
addition carried out oversight functions in relation to environmental 
regulation, permits117 and closure of the activities.118  The Court did 
not explicitly problematize the role of the SOE, but treated it without 
discussion by any of the parties before the Court, and in this author’s 
view, correctly, as a regulatory organ rather than an enterprise, 
although the form of the concession, and especially, the assertion 
that there were no “environmental impacts” after closure, were 
solely covered in private law instruments (contracts).119  For the 
outcome of the case, it was significant that Petroecuador had passed 
on a request for military intervention by the concessionary to the 
Ministry of Defense;120 the intervention of the thus solicited armed 
forces resulted in violations of members of the Sarayaku indigenous 
community’s right to life. Also, at the domestic level, the Ecuadorian 
Ombudsman found Petroecuador responsible, in the context of the 
operations of the private enterprise, for incompliance with the 
obligation to protect from violations of constitutional and 
international human rights.121  This confirms the belief that 
international law is applicable to SOE as a state organ, by virtue of 
its close nexus with the State. 
The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights has not made 
an argument on attribution either. It referred briefly to SOEs when 
observing in its 2016 report on Indigenous Peoples’ rights and 
extractive industries, that State obligations include oversight over 
SOEs and control by independent state organs.122  The Commission 
also referred to Guiding Principle 4 on State-Owned Enterprises and 
the expectation that they lead by example the efforts of the industry 
to respect human rights.123  Otherwise, the language shows 
preoccupation that despite State ownership, SOEs need to be subject 
 
 116  Pueblo Indígena Kichwa de Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Preliminary Exceptions, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) 245, ¶64–64  
(June 27, 2012). 
 117 Id. ¶ 67. 
 118 Id. ¶ 123. 
 119 Id. ¶ 64, 123. 
 120 Id. ¶ 192. 
 121 Id. ¶ 195. 
 122 See IACHR, supra note 24, ¶ 101 (“Therefore, in the opinion of the IACHR, 
when extractive and development projects are implemented by State-run 
companies, the State is required to implement measures of strict supervision.”). 
 123 Id. ¶ 100. 
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to oversight mechanisms.124  The Commission’s view seems to build 
on the experience that SOEs in some countries operate beyond 
regulation and control, and enjoy privileges that private companies 
do not enjoy. However, there has been no development on the legal 
criteria of attribution. 
Most significantly in its recent quasi-judicial activity, the 
Commission had to decide over the admissibility of a complaint 
against Peru, regarding severe contamination by the La Oroya 
industrial complex. The metallurgic industry was owned by the 
State between 1974 and 1997, and then sold to Doe Run, a US 
company.125  The parties had agreed on the fact that when Doe Run 
bought the factory, the environmental obligations were to be 
divided in two parts: the private enterprise would be responsible for 
the installation of pending and new environmental measures, and 
the State of Peru assumed responsibility for the clean-up of the soils 
contaminated before 1997.126  The agreement between the private 
investor and the State would suggest that the State considers itself 
responsible for clean-up regarding past contamination, even though 
environmental legislation at the time of pollution had not yet been 
in force. The available information does not tell whether Peru 
considers this an international obligation; an obligation under 
domestic law only; or whether the agreement was simply an 
outcome of the balance of forces between the US Company and the 
State.127  But it can be expected to be a significant element for 
knowing about the Commission’s understanding of SOE 
obligations, when the IAS body will have to decide on whether the 
agreement was in conformity with the American Convention on 
Human Rights. 
Overall, the Inter-American human rights bodies have not had 
the opportunity to discuss the responsibilities of SOEs as investors 
or enterprises rather than regulators; a very recent case on the 
dismissal of workers from Peruvian SOEs was decided exactly on 
the same token as dismissals by ministries.128  The criterion used in 
Abrill Alosilla has thus not changed, and it is unclear whether it is the 
level of control, the functions of the SOEs or simply state-ownership 
which determine the type of attribution that applies. 
 
 124 Id. ¶ 101. 
 125 La Oroya, supra note 4, ¶ 10. 
 126  La Oroya, supra note 4, ¶ 10. 
 127 This point cannot be addressed in this paper. 
 128 Trabajadores Cesados, supra note 11, ¶ 81. 
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The Inter-American Court has always applied direct attribution 
of state responsibility in cases of SOEs. The Inter-American 
Commission has used the same criterion, but as shown above, 
recently and it would seem confusingly, added a reference to 
Principle 4 of the UN Guiding Principles, without clarifying the 
relation of its content to the American Convention; there might, 
therefore, arise a contradiction to the hypothesis of direct 
attribution, at least if Guiding Principle 4 is interpreted according to 
the Working Group’s reading: in that case, the obligation would 
consist only of “leading by example” and not the human rights 
obligations a State owes through its bodies and institutions (see also 
above, section 2.2).129  It would be important that once presented 
with the opportunity to do so, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights or the Commission could clarify the hypotheses of attribution 
they recur to in case of SOEs. This would allow to differentiate 
responsibility by SOEs—with their respective thresholds, and 
different obligations regarding the obligation to guarantee of human 
rights—from responsibility by State oversight organs. What is 
valuable from the perspective of access to justice, nevertheless, is the 
preoccupation that State ownership must not limit access to justice. 
In that sense, the Court and Commission are consistent in simply 
assuming that state-ownership may never lead to a reduced level of 
attribution or responsibility. What sounds legally surprising in 
comparison the remainder of international jurisprudence on SOEs, 
addresses, in fact, a major concern: the risk of impunity. 
4. SPECIFIC CHALLENGES 
Victims should have an effective remedy even if the act or 
omission of an SOE were not attributable to the State, just as they 
have the right to an effective remedy regarding private business. But 
they might find themselves encountering problems that domestic 
law cannot easily solve. For example, the SOE might not be solvent 
to pay out compensation under domestic law. In such a situation, 
access to justice is ineffective unless the victim can access 
compensation paid by the State, i.e., the principal or “parent” of the 
SOE. In that sense, when discussing state responsibility, and the 
separate entity character of SOEs, the question arises whether there 
are situations that are “left out” by the current theory of attribution, 
 
 129 UN Working Group, supra note 73, ¶ 28, 45, 46. 
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but nevertheless, under international human rights law, require 
providing access to justice. A typical case would be that a victim 
obtains a favorable judgment that protects his or her rights, but finds 
that the SOE is unable to pay out compensation due to lack of 
liquidity. 
In arbitration law, Badia has made a similar argument. He 
considers that the Draft Articles have left loopholes of accountability 
that need to be closed by referring to theories of piercing the 
corporate veil (section 4.1). In human rights law, there are two issues 
that could generate, among others, such loopholes: the initial design 
of a SOE,130 and the impact of old contamination sites, left 
unattended by the SOE or the State.131  The two examples seem to 
have little in common; however, the legal structure accompanying 
them shows what they have in common. 
4.1 Responsibility for human rights violations caused by the initial 
design of SOEs 
Certainly, the establishment of a SOE is not in itself an 
internationally wrongful act. However, the design of a SOE, 
responsibility of governmental organs that clearly fall under Draft 
Article 4, can have consequences which make human rights 
compliance by that same SOE impossible. Such situations could 
arise when the corporate structure is created in order to avoid 
transparency on issues which clearly correspond to public functions; 
on corruption; campaign financing; environmental protection or 
respect of privacy in health services. Most frequently, however, the 
design of SOE mirrors the design of subsidiaries which are deprived 
almost immediately of the revenues they have generated in order to 
avoid pay-out in case of suits. This does not only affect competitors 
who have a founded claim against a subsidiary or a SOE, but also 
vitiates the claim of individuals or communities who are owed 
compensation for human rights violations found by courts. 
 
 130 For a consideration of this argument in jurisprudence, see Dimitar 
Yordanov v. Bulgaria, ECHR App. No. 3401/09 ¶60 (2018).  
 131 See generally Wolf Richter, Ökologische Altlasten und Sanierungen im 
Treuhandnachfolgebereich, STAATSEIGENTUM. LEGITIMATION UND GRENZEN 319 (Otto 
Depenheuer & Bruno Kahl, eds., 2014) (analyzing how the reunified German State 
implemented functions of environmental clean-up through state-owned 
enterprises). 
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Badia has proposed that in international arbitration, the theory 
of piercing the corporate veil should apply in order to cover cases 
where no state responsibility arises according to the Draft Articles. 
This can be the case, for example, if initial under-funding of the SOE 
can be proven, and leads to the failure of debt-serving, then the state 
as a principal could be made responsible.132  In that sense, he argues 
that “when a state is behind [a SOE], the veil should be pierced if 
justice so requests.”133  To our knowledge, the theory has not been 
applied by international tribunals yet, but was received positively 
by some other scholars of international economic law.134 
As Badia does not refer to international human rights law and 
its specific jurisprudence on SOEs, this section will examine to what 
extent a theory of piercing the veil—taken from corporate law, and 
considered a general principle of international law by Badia135—
would effectively improve access to justice for (potential) victims of 
human rights violations committed by SOEs. It should be clarified 
that in civil law jurisdictions, principles of good faith and abuse of 
rights often fulfill the same purpose as the theory of piercing the 
veil.136 
Victims of human rights violations defined in the universal and 
regional human rights treaties should not remain without a 
remedy.137  In that sense, it is possible to draw a parallel to corporate 
law where in certain situations, the parent company is considered 
liable for its subsidiary’s torts or crimes. Arguably, there are three 
situations that are of special interest: first, the structural set-up of the 
SOE, its capitalization and rules on skimming profits. In particular, 
it has to be asked whether a mechanism has been set up in order to 
 
 132 See BADIA, supra note 21, at 198. 
 133  See BADIA, supra note 21, at 201. 
 134 See Michael Feit, Book Review of Piercing the Veil of State Enterprises in 
International Arbitration, by Albert Badia, 30 ICSID REV. 268, 273 (2015) (praising 
Badia for his work and noting that the piercing the veil doctrine has become a 
necessary part of holding SOEs accountable for their actions). 
 135 See generally Katherine Lyons, Piercing the Corporate Veil in the International 
Arena, 33 Syracuse J. Int’l. L. & Com. 523 (2006). 
 136 See José María Lezcano, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Latin American 
Jurisprudence, Routledge (2016), at 21–48 (discussing the English theory of corporate 
personality in comparison with civil law models, and treatment of damage to 
health). See generally Joseph Mauricio Bello, An Overview of the Doctrine of the Piercing 
of the Corporate Veil as applied by Latin American Countries: A US Legal Creation exported 
to civil law jurisdictions, 14 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 615 (2008) (discussing the 
application of piercing the corporate veil in Latin America, and specifically in 
Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela). 
 137 See generally Leader & Ong, supra note 2. 
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pay out compensation to human rights victims, including a 
definition on which place they take in the cascade of obligations;138 
or whether and how funds have been set aside for clean-up after 
closure.  Badia observed that initial underfunding should be 
considered fraudulent.139  Piercing through to the state should also 
be possible if privatization was achieved with clauses that aim at 
avoiding responsibility. 
Second, the corporate veil should be lifted when a state organ 
does not authorize the corresponding funds for taking necessary 
preventive measures with regards to human rights or the 
environment. In those cases, direct state responsibility would arise 
due to the acts or omissions of the regulatory organ, for example, 
Congress or the Ministry of Finance.140  Although these are primary 
obligations under international environmental law, they often 
cannot be enforced, and a residual argument of piercing the 
corporate veil might be considered, in case access to justice cannot 
otherwise be guaranteed, or as Badia has it, if “justice so requires.” 
Third, according to Badia, the state should be made liable when 
it knew or should have known—as owner—of certain practices or 
violations that occur in the SOE. This due diligence argument 
depends, ultimately, on the degree of control that the parent (the 
state) has over the enterprise. However, it seems that all of these 
criteria would also lead to attribution under the law of state 
responsibility as it was presented in section 2.  The gap that a theory 
of piercing the veil could cover is essentially the same that 
international human rights law has already filled through 
interpreting the notions of “control” and “public or governmental 
authority” in the sense the ECtHR has done. 
Thus, in relation to the first and second situations, a state is 
responsible for setting up a SOE under conditions that avoid liability 
in matters of human rights. As the design of a SOE is elaborated by 
state organs that fall under Article 4 Draft Articles, attribution of 
such acts is not controversial in international law, and if they result 
in human rights violations, the State will be responsible under the 
treaties that were in force at the time of setting up a SOE.  As ECtHR 
 
 138 See Rasmiya Kazimova, Insurance as a Risk Management Tool: A Mitigating or 
Aggravating Factor?, in Leader & Ong, supra note 2, at 239. 
 139 BADIA, supra note 21, at 95–98. 
 140 The regulatory creation of industry-wide general compensation funds is 
another option, but it cannot be discussed here. 
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jurisprudence shows, the State is also responsible for continuous 
violations that ensue from set-up faults.141 
In relation to preventive measures, it would be extremely 
difficult in most jurisdictions to argue in favor of piercing the veil, 
although the argument is very similar to the unavailability of funds 
for reparation. The reason seems to be that the obligation of 
prevention is very difficult to enforce. Under international law, 
however, preventive measures have become part and parcel of the 
obligation to guarantee human rights standards to inhabitants, 
communities, and individuals affected by business.142  In that sense, 
it seems that attribution of responsibility, through the finance organs 
that do not authorize the respective budgetary measures, is the 
easiest and more accepted way of solving this type of problem. 
In the third situation, the decision in Heinisch reported above 
refers to this issue of assuming that governmental organs should be 
more interested in and can be better informed about what is 
happening in relation to SOEs over which they have oversight or 
which they (partly) control. While the ECtHR has been reluctant to 
reiterate its rationale from Heinisch, the IACtHR has consistently and 
automatically assumed knowledge in all cases related to SOEs it has 
decided. One question remains pending in this research: Is it a 
reason to pierce the veil if the lack of funding for clean-ups or 
environmental measures is due to mismanagement or corruption in 
the SOE? Does the state have any vicarious liability in such a 
situation?143 Considering the principle of effet util, and the access to 
an effective remedy, it seems that the answer would have to be in 
the affirmative. Research on corruption and human rights has 
repeatedly shown how this crime prejudices human rights 
protection or places it at risk.144 
 
 141 Fadeyeva, supra note 85. 
 142 See generally Ebert & Sijnienski, supra note 22 (discussing the application of 
the Osman test). 
 143 See generally PAULA GILIKER, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN TORT (2010). 
 144 See generally Anne Peters, Corruption as a Violation of International Human 
Rights, 18 MPIL Research Paper (2016), www.mpil.de [https://perma.cc/GQ3B-
9HZ7] (linking corruption and a hostility towards human rights in corrupt and 
crime ridden countries).  For a critical argument, see generally Cecily Rose, The 
Limitations of a Human Rights Approach to Corruption, 65 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 405 
(2016). 
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4.2 Past damage at contaminated sites and state responsibility 
Another specific problem about access to justice in SOE cases 
needs to be mentioned separately.  It is related to historical 
circumstances, but entails important legal consequences.  State-
owned enterprises have often started high-impact business in the 
extractive or energy sectors, when environmental standards were 
still low or non-existent. Contaminated sites, which tend to generate 
long-lasting environmental or health-related damage, remain 
beyond closure of a site, liquidation of the enterprise, insolvency or 
privatization of SOEs, and continues to risk violating human rights 
or causing damage. In domestic law, unless there is specific 
regulation, or a legal or common law disposition regarding 
continuous harmful effects of licit or illicit acts,145 there is usually no 
general remedy available, due to statutes of limitations.  Piercing the 
veil, however, would not solve that problem. 
In such cases, attribution under international law might be the 
only way of accessing a remedy, as international law does recognize 
continuous illicit acts—according to Articles 14 and 15 of the Draft 
Articles of 2001—and does not impose statutory limitations.  If the 
damage had been initially caused by a SOE, it would be the state that 
would be accountable for the continuous consequences of that 
pollution. Peru implicitly acknowledged such a situation when 
carrying out the clean-up for the contamination at La Oroya (see 
section 3.2).  International law, however, does not contain explicit or 
specific rules on old contaminated sites,146 which would have been 
created before the enforcement of international treaties.  Therefore, 
attribution of continuous violations would be possible if State 
control over the SOE fulfilled the criteria set out in section 2.1, at the 
time of contamination, or afterwards when damage could have been 
mitigated or cleaned up.  If this were not the case, attribution is only 
possible for lack of due diligence by oversight organs or other state 
organs, either under human rights treaties or under customary 
international law.147  In those cases, only indirect responsibility 
 
 145 See Richter, supra note 131 (discussing the specific case of ecological clean-
up through SOEs in Eastern Germany after re-unification). 
 146 See generally Anastasia Telesetsky, An Cliquet & Afshin Akhtar-Khavari, 
Ecological Restoration in International Environmental Law, Routledge (2016) (detailing 
the “soft” legal régime that ecological restoration lives under in the international 
law context, the regional law context, and the individual law context). 
 147 See generally JOANNA KULESZA, DUE DILIGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2016). 
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would arise, by virtue of the horizontal state obligation to protect, 
pursuant to, for one example, Article 1.1 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights. 
5. CONCLUSION: SUMMARY OF CRITERIA FOR ATTRIBUTION OF SOE 
ACTS AND OMISSIONS TO THE STATE 
This paper discussed to what extent acts and omissions of SOEs 
in matters of human rights must be attributed to the state.  Under 
current general international law, jurisprudence and literature seem 
to exclude the possibility of attributing responsibility for SOE acts 
and omissions unless they are related to governmental authority, or, 
arguably, a sufficiently close control over the SOE by the state.  Thus, 
any purely commercial activity, and human rights violations 
committed in their pursuit, would not be directly attributable.  
Rather, for those cases, there seems to be a consensus in international 
human rights law that if the regulatory or supervisory organs had not 
acted diligently or acted in any other way contrary to the state’s 
international human rights obligations, responsibility arises for that 
organs’ acts and omissions.  Also, state responsibility accrues for the 
lack of access to justice rather than for the initial act carried out by 
the SOE.   
The criteria that indicate direct state responsibility for SOEs, to 
the contrary, have been developed in arbitration jurisprudence, and 
more specifically, in the European Court of Human Rights. The 
Inter-American System has not developed criteria for distinguishing 
cases of attribution from others; rather, it has dealt with all SOEs as 
if they were state organs.  This is justifiable due to the close control 
of government over the SOE, or its governmental (usually 
regulatory) function.  However, it would be useful if the IAS bodies 
would clarify their criteria for attributing acts and omissions of SOEs 
to a state. 
The criteria of direct attribution that have been found in 
international human rights law—explicitly or implicitly—can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
a. Public function or governmental authority 
  Regulatory or governmental function 
  Administrative law or special legal schemes applicable, 
instead of insolvency law or general corporate law 
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  Jurisdiction of administrative courts, rather than ordinary 
courts 
  The nature of the SOE’s activity is public, i.e. refers to 
provision of public services (only in IHRL) 
  Monopoly position 
b. State control over the company 
  Nomination and withdrawal of leading executives and 
board members 
  Ministerial participation in boards, especially with specific 
voting rights 
  Veto provisions or decision-making prerogatives for state 
organs, regarding certain decisions, especially, budgetary 
assignations 
  Jurisdiction of administrative courts, rather than ordinary 
courts 
  The SOE has specific accountability or reporting obligations 
towards the State 
  The SOE is identified as a governmental organ in publicity, 
internet presence, and especially, discourse by leading executives 
c. Additional indicators: procedural consistency 
  State has invoked immunity for the SOE, in this or other 
proceedings 
  Coherence of procedural facts, for example, representation 
by governmental organs in domestic or international disputes 
These criteria need to be assessed globally for ‘control’ and 
‘public function and governmental authority’; this means that not all 
of these elements have to be fulfilled in order to find in favor of 
attribution. Rather, all facts are taken together to see whether the 
SOE carries out governmental functions, and/or is closely 
controlled by state organs, respectively. As was shown, there are 
additionally some soft-law standards such as the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, which do not relate to 
any definition on attribution.  Rather, they define a manner to 
proceed with minimum requirements, which do not comply with 
international human rights law. 
Regarding the proposal to use theories of piercing the corporate 
veil regarding SOEs, in cases where the Draft Articles leave doubt 
about effective state responsibility, this paper has argued that all 
situations that such a legal device could cover, are encompassed by 
international human rights jurisprudence already: No specific 
situation could be detected where the theory of piercing the 
corporate veil, understood as a principle of international law, would 
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actually suggest responsibility, while attribution rules for human 
rights cases would not.  Rather, all situations that Badia identified as 
problematic, can be subsumed under the attribution rules identified 
in this article.  The main systematic reason for this conclusion is the 
fact that both corporate veil theories and attribution theories are 
based on the examination of the control of the SOE by the State (the 
“parent”).  Additionally, public service hypotheses, recognized in 
international human rights law as a basis for attribution, cannot be 
accounted for by corporate veil theories. Furthermore, one of the 
difficult cases from a human rights perspective—the case of 
historically contaminated sites abandoned or created by SOEs—
cannot be solved by piercing the veil, but only by attributing state 
responsibility for continuous violations. 
As this article has shown, there are several strong arguments for 
attributions of actions and omissions by SOEs in matters of human 
rights to the state itself, especially if the SOE carries out 
governmental functions, are significantly controlled by the State, or 
might avoid paying out compensation through early 
reincorporation of revenues to the state budget.  Jurisprudence in 
several human rights bodies shows that SOEs must be considered 
the first business entities that under international law, have direct 
responsibilities.  Of course, this responsibility is “mediated” 
through the state to which SOE actions and omissions are 
attributable, but regional courts and UN committees have found 
that a state cannot sever itself from its human rights obligations by 
creating a SOE.  Future research and legal argument has to show 
whether these arguments are equally applicable to different rights, 
or whether they are rights-specific, just like positive obligations, due 
diligence obligations and obligations of progressive realization.  In 
order to decide on state responsibility in concrete cases, and once 
attribution issues are solved, it is necessary to assess the scope and 
content of human rights obligations owed by a SOE. In that sense, 
SOEs are the only business entities which can be seen, as of now, to 
have direct responsibility under international law lege lata. 
Furthermore, it seems to be clear that a state should not consider 
its due diligence obligations exhausted when determining that a 
SOE is not solvent to pay out compensation, if this lack of funds is 
due to initial underfunding, or to the excessive incorporation of 
utilities into the state budget. By the same token, the state cannot 
avoid responsibility—in this case, responsibility of state organs 
under Article 4 of the Draft Articles—when failing to assign 
additional funds to human rights protection.  The same is true for 
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failure to provide access to justice in SOE cases.  Finally, if a state 
chooses to comply with its obligations to guarantee and provide 
services, which are considered fulfillment of rights, through SOEs, 
the jurisprudence of various human rights bodies coalesces around 
the assertion that state responsibility should not be limited, in 
comparison with a state that chooses to provide those services 
through public services or private entities. 
Of course, solving specific SOE problems does not solve access 
to justice problems for those cases in which it is accepted that a SOE 
acts as private business. In those cases, an alleged victim of human 
rights violations encounters the challenges of, for example, third 
party standing, the definition of human rights in domestic 
constitutional or legal provisions, or issues of extraterritorial 
liabilities. 
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